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Highlights 
 We identify 6 desirable attributes of methods designed to tackle wicked problems. 
 We evaluate Intuitive Logics Scenario Planning against these attributes. 
 We also evaluate recent augmentations of Intuitive Logics Scenario Planning. 
 We compare a range of soft operational research methods against these attributes. 
 We show scenario planning has benefits that complement soft operational research. 
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Abstract 
This paper provides a review and evaluation of the use of scenario methods from the Intuitive Logics 
(IL) school to address so-called ‘wicked problems’. Scenario planning has been widely advocated by 
its practitioners and its popularity has increased in the practice arena since the Millennium. However, 
some academics have described the technique as an ‘art’ that lacks theoretical and methodological 
rigour. Over recent years, academics have responded to this critique, drawing on both empirical and 
conceptual studies. This has led to a multiplicity of augmented IL scenario methods. Here, we review 
these developments and compare them to soft OR methods as a means of tackling  wicked problems, 
drawing, in particular, on Churchman’s moral imperative that we must address the whole problem, not 
merely ‘carve off’ one part.  We conclude that IL scenario planning can be a useful tool in the OR 
practitioner’s tool kit and  that it can complement many of the established soft OR methods. 
 
Keywords: scenarios; intuitive logics; soft OR methods; wicked problems; decision making. 
  
4 
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 This paper presents an overview of the contemporary status of scenario methods from the 
Intuitive Logics (IL) school. Specifically, the text explores the potential of IL approaches in exploring 
so-called ‘wicked problems’, as defined in the OR field by Churchman (1967).  Here, a wicked 
problem is one that is, “ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many 
clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system 
are thoroughly confusing” (Churchman, 1967, p. B-141). Additionally, it identifies those approaches 
that address Churchman’s moral imperative that, “whoever attempts to tame a part of a wicked 
problem, but not the whole, is morally wrong” (p. B-142).  
 In narrowing the approach to address scenario planning methods from the IL school, the paper 
first discusses the principles of these in relation to the other two dominant schools of scenario 
planning; the French La Prospective, and Probabilistic Modified Trends (PMT) methodology (cf. 
Amer et al., 2013; Bradfield et al., 2005). Then, in considering the application of IL methods to 
address wicked problems, the text considers scenario analysis in relation to other soft OR methods, 
including those commonly used in organizational interventions (see Rosenhead & Mingers, 2001), 
namely: soft systems methodology (SSM) (Checkland, 1985), the strategic choice approach (Friend & 
Hickling, 1997), and SODA/Journey Making (Eden, 1988; Eden & Ackerman, 2013).  
 Scenario planning has been widely used in both public (e.g. Centre for Strategic Futures; 
Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre) and private (e.g. Courtney et al, 2013; Roxburgh, 2009) sectors 
over decades, with an increase in interest in the aftermath of the terror attacks of September 2001 in 
New York and Washington. The origins of scenario literature lie to a large extent in the publications 
of practitioners from the Royal Dutch Shell organization (e.g. Schwartz, 1991; Wack, 1985a, 1985b). 
Emerging from the practice arena, scenario planning was the target of critique by business academics 
(e.g. Mintzberg, 1994; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 1998; Porter, 1985), who argued that it was 
more of an ‘art’ than a management science approach. 
 While this paper outlines the practice origins of scenario planning, it also addresses these 
critiques in terms of more recent academic studies that have extended both conceptual and empirical 
debate of scenario methods. The key focus of the paper is to provide a summary review of key 
developments in this literature, of their contributions to both theory and practice, and with 
consideration of their relevance for, and application in, the field of OR in response to wicked 
problems and with regard to Churchman’s (1967) moral imperative, calling for an holistic approach to 
such problems. 
 
2.0 Challenges for strategic decision making in the face of wicked problems 
 Recent events with far-reaching consequences, but that were largely unforeseen; such as the 
financial crisis of 2007, the BREXIT vote in the UK, and the election of Donald Trump in the USA; 
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have drawn attention to the high levels of uncertainty faced by strategic decision makers. Events such 
as these have impacts over extended periods and at a global scale, shaping the socio-economic and 
geo-political macro-environment, and being largely beyond the control of single organizations and 
their decision makers. The uncertainty inherent in the environment within which strategic planners 
operate serves only to increase the complexity of organisational decision making. In recent decades, 
there has been increased attention to such ‘wicked problems’, a term first applied by Rittel and 
Webber (1973) in the field of planning and public policy. These writers contrast ‘wicked’ problems – 
that they also describe as ‘malignant’, ‘vicious’, ‘tricky’, or ‘aggressive’ – in the social arena with 
what they term ‘tame’ or ‘benign’ (p. 136) problems in the natural sciences. They posit that while the 
latter are generally solved by finding ‘the answer’, the former are subject to “elusive political 
judgment” (p. 136) and, as such, are never ‘solved’, only resolved in the most appropriate way.    
 Rittel and Webber identified ten characteristics of wicked problems. (1) they  lack a definitive 
formulation; (2) they have no stopping rule –constraints on time or resources or the perception that  
the current resolution is ‘good enough’ will determine when work on the problem is terminated; (3) 
resolutions of wicked problems are not true or false –they can only be judged  as ‘good’, ‘bad’,  
‘better’ or ‘satisfactory’; (4) there is no immediate or ultimate test of a resolution of a wicked problem 
-  the repercussions and impacts of the resolution will occur in a virtually boundless future and may be 
unforeseen and unintended; (5) every resolution  is a ‘one shot’ operation with significant 
consequences, which precludes the ability to refine a solution through trial and error; (6) it is not 
possible to enumerate an exhaustive set of potential solutions; (7) every wicked problem is essentially 
unique; (8) every wicked problem is the symptom of another problem; (9) the choice of explanation of 
the problem and hence its resolution depends on the analyst’s world view; and (10) decision makers 
are held responsible for the consequences of the actions they take in attempting to resolve a wicked 
problem. In the face of such complex and ambiguous problems, the value of traditional decision-
support tools, such as optimising techniques or decision trees have been called into question. 
(Goodwin and Wright, 2014).  
 In the strategic planning context the challenges posed by wicked problems are compounded by 
two factors. First, where the decision making process in response to a wicked problem involves 
multiple organizations, there are likely to be a variety of stakeholders involved in, and affected by, the 
process. As such, differences in disciplinary perspectives may be attenuated by divergent, and 
possibly conflicting values, priorities and stakeholder expectations. While there may be an expressed 
shared interest in the problem, it is likely that some stakeholders’ key focus and interest may lie 
elsewhere and in potential conflict with the stated intent (cf. Vangen, 2017). Such issues of conflicting 
priorities, levels of information exchange, and degrees of common interest and involvement in 
application of soft OR methods have been highlighted and problematized (cf. Joldersma & Roelofs, 
2004). Hence, what might appear on the surface to be a straightforward issue may well be perceived 
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and understood in very different ways within the ‘multiple realities’ (Beech and Cairns, 2001) of 
organization life, even by members of a seemingly cohesive and committed group. 
 Second, as implied by Rittel and Webber’s fourth characteristic, decisions will be made within 
the context of high levels of uncertainty about the future  The human brain is limited in the number of 
concepts it can process simultaneously (Hogarth, 1987) so, unaided, decision makers are likely to 
have difficulty in addressing the potential interplay and impact of a large number of ‘driving forces’ – 
those political, economic, social, technological, ecological and legal factors that will impact on a 
wicked problem and whose alternate resolutions will drive different futures (Postma & Liebl, 2005; 
Schwartz, 1991). Aleatory uncertainty is present where probabilities can be attached to potential 
outcomes based on a priori reasoning or empirical frequencies of specific outcomes in similar events. 
However, in the future, unique, rare, or hitherto unwitnessed events may determine the success of a 
chosen strategy when tackling a wicked problem. Some of these events, so-called ‘black swans’ 
(Taleb, 2007), may have the potential to cause huge impacts. Moreover, events may appear ‘out of the 
blue’ without any apparent evidential basis in the present (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014). Some 
events may fall into the category of ‘unknown unknowns’ or ontological uncertainties (Ilmola and 
Rovenskaya, 2016). 
 In reviewing IL scenario methods as relevant to wicked problem resolution and in comparison to 
extant soft OR methods, two questions come immediately to mind. First, IL scenario methods address 
potential future outcomes to such problems, but to what extent, if any, do they directly inform the 
decision making process? Second, soft OR methods are designed to support decision making in the 
face of complex and ambiguous problems, but to what extent, if any, do they provide a framework for 
structured consideration of the full range of potential futures? Before addressing extant IL scenario 
methods, this paper first considers key issues in the OR field.  
 
2.1 Wicked problems in the context of OR development 
 Over the past decade, there has been only a couple of mentions of the term ‘wicked problem’ in 
the pages of the European Journal for Operational Research (Hector, C et al., 2009; Mingers & 
White, 2010). Both sets of authors refer to the ‘mess’ of such problems and the need to address the 
multiple ‘worldviews’ or ‘perspectives’ of a range of ‘stakeholders’. While adopting different core 
foci, both articles are concerned with the search for more effective problem structuring approaches 
through the application of soft systems methodologies. Hector et al. (2009) specifically address the 
philosophical foundations of alternative worldviews, and clearly state their own stance as a, 
“moderate form of ‘critical realism’” (p. 697), whereby, “while ‘Truth’ exists – there is an objective 
‘fact of the matter’ and all propositions are only either true or false – for some problems, we cannot 
unequivocally determine the truth or falsity of the proposition at issue” (p. 697). Here, we seek to 
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expand OR methods through reviewing IL scenario methods from an alternative stance, grounded in 
Aristotle’s (350BCE/2004) philosophy and his ‘intellectual virtues’.  
 Aristotle outlines three key ‘virtues’ that underpin our understanding of the world and our 
responses to it, namely: episteme, techne and phronēsis. The first of these addresses scientific 
knowledge that is eternal, universal and teachable. The second describes knowledge of production, of 
“something that is capable of being or of not being” (p. 149). The third virtue, phronēsis; ‘prudence’ 
or ‘practical wisdom’; is “concerned with acts that are just and admirable and good for man (sic)” 
(p.162). Adopting an Aristotelian stance leads us to posit that absolute ‘truth’ lies only in the field of 
the epistemic – universal, non-contextual and teachable knowledge. In seeking to respond to wicked 
problems in line with Churchman’s (1967) moral imperative, we are concerned with understanding 
through phronēsis, with knowledge to inform action for the good of humanity. Contemporary 
interpretation of phronēsis as practice (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2003) leads us to consider the centrality of 
issues of power and rationality in how such problems may, or may not be addressed, and to whose 
benefit and whose loss. As such, in reviewing IL scenario methods, while we have concern for rigour 
of the method, our core focus is on questions of to what effect the method has  on resolving the 
problem at hand. 
 
 
3.0 Desirable attributes of methods designed to tackle wicked problems 
 Consideration of the core intent of seeking resolution of the wicked problem leads to six key 
assertions to underpin an idealised framework, namely: 
1. The approach to tacking the problem should have a sound theoretical underpinning. Without 
this underpinning, the approach to the problem ‘can never be fully understood or validated’ 
(Chermack, 2004).  
2. Wicked problems are by nature complex and ambiguous. As such, they must be analysed 
through a process of structured decomposition to expose their full complexity, and to ensure 
that they are not subject to reduction and potential exclusion, thereby fulfilling Churchman’s 
(1967) moral imperative that they must be ‘tamed’ in their entirety. 
3. They involve a broad constituency with varying beliefs and values, and with different degrees 
of power. Exploration must therefore engage the full range of both involved and, potentially, 
impacted stakeholders, taking account of those that are remote and often excluded, and of 
future generations 
4. They are subject to multiple cultural, value-based interpretations, yet capable of rational 
analysis. As such, investigation must provide a forum not only to bring relevant rational, 
scientific knowledge to the table, but also to allow challenge to extant mindsets and 
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discussion of competing rationalities as to how such knowledge is interpreted and acted upon, 
in a non-threatening environment 
5. The approach should acknowledge and respond appropriately to uncertainty where it exists 
6. The aim must be to seek resolution of the problem, not merely analysis, following the 
principles of phronēsis, as thinking to inform action for the good of humanity. So, there 
should be an outcome of a set of articulated actions, with allocated responsibilities and 
timescales for achievement. 
 From each of these assertions, a basic attribute of the idealised model is developed, as follows. 
 
3.1 Attribute #1: Sound theoretical underpinning 
 Without theory we can have no understanding of how a method works and why it is appropriate 
for tackling particular wicked problems.  Anecdotes that make claims for the success of a method in a 
given circumstance yield insufficient evidence of the general efficacy of the method. An explicit 
theory also allows for the possibility that its propositions can be empirically tested. 
 
3.2 Attribute #2 Making sense of complexity through structured analysis 
 First, given the need to support decision makers in making sense of complex and, possibly, 
puzzling situations ( Pidd, 1996), the method should facilitate structured decomposition of the 
decision problem (Arkes et al., 2010; Pidd, 1996, p102), but without reduction and exclusion 
(Checkland, 2000; Pinson et al. 1997).  Axiom-based structured decomposition and subsequent re-
composition enables complex judgmental tasks to be broken down into simpler sub-tasks, thereby 
overcoming the limited cognitive processing capacity of the human mind (Bolger and Wright, 1992; 
Ozer, 2008). It also allows for division of labour between participants, enabling specialists to 
contribute where they are most needed and enables objective data to be used where it is available.  As 
such, it should allow a wider range of issues, and their interaction, to be addressed and, in particular, 
should lead to the acknowledgement of uncertainty. Structured decomposition also allows individuals’ 
thinking to be documented, making it transparent to other participants in the decision process. This 
should permit acknowledgement and recognition of potential differences in priorities and key 
objectives. It should therefore lead to open discussion on finding common ground around a focal issue 
of concern.  
 
3.3 Attribute #3: Participative inquiry involving all stakeholders  
 Second, the method should allow group-based involvement in the development of strategy 
through a process that Franco and Montibeller (2010) refer to as ‘facilitated modelling’. Similar 
approaches have been  used in other fields, such as system dynamics, where they have been referred  
to as group modelling, cooperative modelling and shared vision planning (e.g. see Tidwell and Van 
Den Brink, 2008).  Facilitated modelling differs from traditional operational research (OR) practice, 
9 
 
where an analyst builds a model based on interactions with a client and then recommends a course of 
action.   Instead, it involves the analyst acting as a facilitator and working alongside the client though 
the entire modelling process. As such, it involves both group facilitation and participative modelling 
in a workshop setting (Franco and Rouwette, 2011, Hodgkinson et al., 2006).  Franco and Montibeller 
argue that a facilitated mode is suitable in interventions where, inter-alia, the problems are socially 
constructed entities, where subjectivity is unavoidable and where participation increases commitment 
for implementation.  Such a process should provide the opportunity for ‘democratic conversation’. 
This will ensure that key questions are addressed openly, whilst acknowledging the unavoidable play 
of power, politics and competing rationalities to achieve legitimacy (Checkland, 2000, Ackermann, 
2012, Hamel, 2000 . The process associated with the method will be sensitive to the receptiveness of 
the organisation and the group composition and will be able to cope with any time constraints on 
participants’ availability (Eden, 1992).  
 
3.4 Attribute #4: Presenting challenge to current mindsets in a non-threatening environment 
 Further, given the dangers of overly restricted mental frames and strategic inertia, the approach 
should include mechanisms that provide challenges to participants’ current thinking (Glick et al., 
2012). It should also help to mitigate biases arising from the use of simplifying mental heuristics 
(Kahneman, 2011). An ideal process will therefore impose no constraints on the development of new 
thinking and perspectives and will support adaptive organizational learning (Haeffner et al., 2012). To 
achieve this, it will need to enable the engagement of the ‘broad’ (Freeman, 1984) stakeholder 
community, eliciting diverse values, beliefs and ethical frameworks in an open and inclusive 
conversation. It should also actively promote dialectical inquiry and Devil’s advocacy, subject to the 
ground rules above (Schweiger et al.1989), and draw upon and integrate both internal expertise and 
that of external experts). Morecroft (1984) notes that the dialectic method is appropriate where there 
are widely differing opinions regarding a situation – such an approach forces people to explore and 
scrutinize issues in depth and to justify the logic of their thinking.   
 
3.5 Attribute #5 Acknowledge and respond appropriately to uncertainty 
The existence of uncertainty, in both the present and the future  should be acknowledged and 
confronted and the approach to tackling the wicked problem should support the design of robust 
strategies that are intended to perform acceptably whatever the future may bring (Pidd, 1996, p.43, 
Rosenhead, 2001).  Such a strategy  is likely to be flexible –for example, ‘get out’ clauses can be 
inserted in contracts -and involve redundancy so that spare resources are available to cope with 
unforeseen demands 
 
3.6 Attribute #6: Articulated action, responsibility, implications and impact 
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Finally, the method should inform decision making, linking organizational priorities to broad 
social/environmental (moral) needs and  providing  a recommended course of action . It should 
prompt the development and discussion of policy options and their joint implementation by 
stakeholder groupings through their articulated action (Franco, 2006). It will be perceived by 
participants as being useful, credible and relevant, leading to implemented actions and, where 
appropriate, it will act as a catalyst for change. There will be an allocation of responsibility for action 
and an end date will be set for reporting back on progress (Bernardo et al., 2017, Elbanna et al., 2016, 
Miller, 1997). At the end of the process there will be an organisational memory and transitional object 
to influence the implementation of strategy (Eden, 1992).  As such, the outcomes of the process 
should provide clearly articulated actions for all stakeholders, with an audit trail of reasoning, 
including identification of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. There will be both, since we are not dealing with 
moral relativism. 
 
4.0 Soft OR methods for tackling wicked problems 
 The emergence of soft OR has its roots in the period of ‘disciplinary malaise’ (Rosenhead,2006) 
which emerged  in the 1960s and extended into the 1970s and 1980s when some took the view that 
OR had restricted itself to ‘tame’ and relatively well-defined problems (Churchman, 1967).  Ackoff’s 
writings of this time (Ackoff, 1979) and later the works of  Mingers (2000) and others (e.g., 
Rosenhead, 1990) exemplify the concerns over OR’s apparent inability to effectively structure, 
“messy, complex problem situations”, “exploring the differing views and perspectives of the 
stakeholders”, and “facilitating participation and engagement” (p. 674, emphasis in original).  
 In recent years, the field of soft OR has undergone somewhat of a rebranding with the 
introduction of the term PSMs or Problem Structuring Methods.  In relevant literature, there is 
currently no distinction between soft OR and PSMs with some using the terms interchangeably 
(Mingers 2011).  In this paper we have chosen to use the term soft OR since scenario methods go 
beyond the phase of structuring problems. 
 In providing an overview of extant literature on the application of soft OR methods, many works 
focus on three predominant approaches:  soft systems methodology (SSM) (Checkland, 1985), SODA 
and Journey Making both of which are based around the technique of cognitive mapping (Eden, 1988, 
Eden & Ackermann, 2013) and the strategic choice approach (SCA) (Friend and Hickling, 1997).  We 
briefly introduce each of these approaches here and illustrate their application through selected case 
studies. 
 
4.1 Soft Systems Methodology (SSM)  
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Reprising thirty years of soft systems methodology (SSM), Checkland (2000) highlighted the 
difference between systems that can be understood as ‘hard’, autonomous and capable of being 
engineered systemically, and those that he describes as ‘soft’, exhibiting ‘complexity and confusion’ 
that can be understood through systemic inquiry.  SSM is a methodology for exploring human activity 
systems which Checkland describes as a learning system where learning about the situation helps 
participants find accommodations that lead them towards action.(Rosenhead & Mingers 2001)  The 
methodology consists of seven stages which can be conducted in sequence, or considered as a set of 
guiding principles – see figure 1.  A key concept to the methodology is the distinction between two 
worlds, the real world containing the problem situation and within which any subsequent action must 
be taken, and a virtual world where systems thinking about the real world takes place.   
 
 
Figure 1: The early ‘7-stage’ representation of SSM ( Rosenhead & Mingers, 2001: p71) 
 
Such inquiry into the nature of soft systems bears many similarities with scenario analysis. It calls for 
exploration of the problem situation, including its cultural and political aspects. It also requires 
inquiry into the nature of the actors, or stakeholders, and of their potentially conflicting interests. 
Importantly, SSM requires development of models, or systems, that are intended to, “improve the 
situation and are regarded as both desirable and (culturally) feasible” (p. S21). In setting out the 
‘basic’ IL scenario method, van der Heijden et al. (2002) make frequent reference to ‘systems 
thinking’ as inherent to the process. In his retrospective, Checkland (2000) also recognises some 
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aspects of SSM over time that are similar to the scenario field, first, where practitioner accounts are 
most frequently of claimed success, and lacking detailed methodological rigour. 
4.2 Strategic Choice Approach (SCA)  
SCA emerged from the work of practitioners within the Institute of OR and the Tavistock Institute 
supporting the development of strategic decisions and public policy. Consisting of four stages or 
‘modes of decision making’ (Rosenhead & Mingers, 2001, p.118) it is designed to identify and 
analyse strategic decisions with respect to preferences and uncertainty.  In particular the approach 
identifies three categories of uncertainty:  
 uncertainty about the working environment – suggesting the need for further information 
 uncertainty about the guiding values – suggesting the need for clearer policies 
 uncertainty about choices on related agendas – suggesting the need for broader 
perspectives. 
The methodology follows four stages or ‘modes of decision making’ (Rosenhead & Mingers, 200. 
p118):  The first stage involves shaping the set of decision problems that decision makers face, 
debating how the problems should be formulated and exploring links and connections between them; 
issues of scope are also addressed, where for example a complex situation may be broken down into a 
series of sub-problems.  Stage 2 focuses on designing the collection of options or courses of action 
that could possibly be used to address the set of problems highlighted in the shaping stage.  In stage 
three, the set of options are compared against identified criteria and the three categories of uncertainty 
noted above. Importantly, note that the three categories do not explicitly encompass uncertainty about 
the future. The fourth and final stage involves choosing between the options and committing to action 
and reviewing alternative strategies for managing uncertainty through time. 
 
4.3 SODA & Journey Making 
Like SSM, in its early form, SODA (Strategic Options Development and Analysis) (Eden, 1988) was 
developed to focus more on the internal workings of an organizational context, offering a structured 
means of exploring a problem situation from multiple perspectives, making sense of different options 
for its resolution through consideration of the logics of causal mapping.  Developed from Kelly’s 
work on personal constructs (Kelly, 1955), SODA focuses on developing cognitive maps with 
individuals and then merging maps to form a single strategic map which is used for further discussion 
within a facilitated group setting, the objective of which is to gain commitment to agreed and 
negotiated action.  In its more recently revised and augmented form, Journey Making (JOintly 
Understanding, Reflecting, and Negotiating strategY) (Eden & Ackerman, 2013), participants work 
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within a group-facilitated setting to produce a joint cognitive map; extensions to the methodology 
embrace external environmental factors and used to support consideration of potential impacts of 
organizational courses of action in the broader societal context.  
 
4.4 Combining soft OR approaches 
 While academic debate might refer to various OR ‘methods’, in the practice arena, these may 
well be referred to as ‘tools’. To draw on the latter metaphor, we would posit that the OR practitioner, 
like the master craftsman, must have access to and knowledge of all the essential tools for undertaking 
the task at hand. These will each have unique strengths for a particular task, but they are not always 
uniquely placed to address that task – materials can be ‘fixed together’ using a hammer and nails or a 
screwdriver and screws. This paper argues that each of the soft OR methods briefly overviewed has its 
own unique strengths, but also its area of overlap with others.  Table 1 illustrates these points with a 
selection of the numerous documented applications of the soft OR approaches described above. .In 
illustrating the applications we have sought to present a small sample of cases that demonstrate the 
variety of deployments reported in the literature; we have selected one case associated with the 
originator(s) of the methods and at least one other example where the method has been fully or 
partially applied, sometimes in combination with one or more approaches. The final two columns in 
the Table are focussed on outlining how a particular soft OR method deals with (i) future uncertainty 
and (ii) decision making. As we will see later, it is on these two desirable attributes (see Section 3) 
that our evaluation of both the basic IL scenario method and its later augmentations will pivot. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 The first three examples describe case studies where a single methodology has been applied, drawing 
on its particular strengths.  Thus for example the explicit comparison of the two worlds (actual and 
virtual) within SSM was used within the NHS information strategy case to help highlight gaps and 
opportunities in the provision of support that a new strategy might address.  The remaining examples 
illustrate cases studies where a methodology has either been augmented with additional approaches, 
as in the case of Journey Making, a development of SODA, or where elements of different 
methodologies have been combined into a multimethodology (Mingers & Gill, 1997; Bennett, 1985) 
as in the case by Ormerod (1995) where a bespoke methodology has been created to suit both the 
particular needs of the problem situation and the expertise of the facilitator. 
In reviewing these cases and their use of the three classic soft OR methodologies described 
above, we compare them to the six desirable attributes of approaches for dealing with wicked 
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problems identified earlier in the paper.  Both SSM and SCA have strong foundations in practice 
whilst SODA/Journey Making was developed from the work of Kelly (1955). Importantly, note that  
these foundations do not utilise a normative axiom base, as in the underpinnings of the ”hard” OR 
decision analysis method. Attributes two and three are satisfied by each of the approaches since they 
each adopt a structured approach to dealing with the complexities of the problem situation often 
within a facilitated workshop setting involving a range of stakeholders.  Each of the approaches 
contains elements that offer opportunities to challenge participant thinking, attribute four.  For 
example SSM contrasts the current, real world with a virtual world developed from root definitions 
and activity models and SODA compares and merges the cognitive maps from different stakeholder 
participants.  Each approach partially satisfies attribute five, but the uncertainty captured is typically 
about the present rather than the future, unless the approach has been augmented with this focus in 
mind.  Finally the approaches differ in their approaches to identifying and committing to action, 
attribute six. 
In the remainder of the paper, the strengths – and weaknesses – of contemporary IL scenario 
methods are discussed on the basis that they offer their own unique potential to enhance the range and 
capabilities of soft OR methods, particularly with respect to future uncertainty. First, a brief 
background to the origins and development of scenario method is presented, before moving on to 
review recent augmentations. 
 
5.0 Scenario methods: origins, applications and critiques 
 Scenario methods are used as a means to elicit and synthesise expert opinion on potential futures 
and their codified origins can be traced back to the work of the American Rand corporation in the 
1950s (Bradfield et al, 2005). Over the following decades, three main ‘schools’ or methods emerged 
and rose to prominence in the literature (Amer et al., 2013; Bradfield et al., 2005), namely: ‘Intuitive 
Logics’, the French-origin method of ‘La Prospective’, and ‘Probabilistic Modified Trends’ (PMT). 
The latter two school’s methodologies share the commonalities of: (i) a focus on probability and the 
identification of the ‘most probable’ scenarios, and (ii) use of expert consultants who are familiar with 
the underpinning quantitative modelling tools. In contrast, the Intuitive Logics method is a qualitative, 
group-process-based approach that is focused on the development of multiple scenarios that explore 
the ‘limits of possibility’ for the future without regard to issues of probability, as opposed to the 
development of singular, ‘normative’ scenarios of some ideal future – as in applications of the La 
Prospective methodology.  
 In dealing with the range of possible futures, IL literature also refers to their plausibility. Here, 
plausibility becomes a socially-negotiated framing of what is seen as broadly reasonable, rather than 
an imposed constraint based on individual beliefs and values. A key focus in the scenario 
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development process is the identification of the causal processes that lead to the unfolding of a 
particular future. 
 Because the Intuitive Logics (IL) method is not axiom-based, numerous variations have been 
published, varying from five to fifteen, or more, steps (Vanston et al., 1977). However, all share a 
common set of underlying principles, as set out below. 
 
5.1 Fundamentals of the IL approach to scenario building 
 Outlining a number of then-current scenario approaches in the practice arena, Huss and 
Honton (1987, p.21) offered an overview of the IL approach as assuming that improved organisational 
decisions are based on understanding a complex set of relationships among economic, political, 
technological, social, resource and environmental factor that are the “driving forces” underpinning the 
unfolding of the future environment, lie largely outside the focal organization. In contemporary 
scenario literature, these driving forces are generally listed under the acronym PESTEL, or similar 
(STEEPL, PESTLE, etc.), relating to stability/change in politics, economics, social factors,  
technology, the natural environment and legal structures (e.g. Buytendijk, Hatch & Micheli, 2010; 
Walsh, 2005). 
 Note that while the outcomes of particular driving forces may not be predictable, in considering 
different potential outcomes, there are linkages of cause/effect and chronology that may be seen as 
plausible and others that are implausible. Here, the strength of human ‘disciplined intuition’ 
(Jungermann and Thuring, 1987) comes into play whereby, for example: i) the election of one 
political party – of either a right- or left-wind persuasion – is more likely to prompt one line of policy 
priorities and practices than another on, say, issues of free health care provision or corporate taxation, 
or ii) the emergence of one set of variations to historical long-term climate conditions will support one 
particular change to agricultural production in a specific region over another. 
 Based on the exploration and analysis of identified driving forces, and of the plausibility of the 
links of cause/effect and causality, a number of future scenarios are then developed. Generally, the 
scenario narratives focus on critical issues that are central to the focal organisation’s key strategic 
concerns and decision needs. In the basic IL approach, however, the focal organization is not an actor 
in the scenarios (van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, Cairns & Wright, 2002). Rather, the scenario 
storylines are intended to inform the organization’s strategic thinking on how it might either thrive 
and survive, or wilt and die under each set of scenario conditions, thereby prompting appropriate 
policy and planning responses to enable strength and resilience in the face of the set of developed  
future scenarios.  Notably, the basic IL scenario development process is, usually, conducted within a 
single organisation and involves many senior managers as part of an externally-facilitated “scenario 
team”. In more sophisticated applications, the scenario team members are selected to represent 
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different perspectives on a focal issue of concern and “remarkable people” - individuals with expert 
knowledge or unconventional but authoritative view on crucial uncertainties or perceived-to-be trends 
in the external environment - are brought into the process to challenge the scenario team’s thinking by 
the externally-based scenario practitioners who are sensitive to issues of “groupthink”. 
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Case & Source Methodology used Issues addressed How uncertainty about the 
future was dealt with 
How a recommended decision 
was identified 
Information 
Strategy  
development at an 
NHS acute hospital 
(Checkland, 2001) 
SSM The creation of an information 
strategy within a large acute NHS 
hospital, involving a large group of 
NHS professionals. 
Not reported in the case. After conducting a CATWOE 
analysis, activity models for the 
major activities within the 
hospital were produced which 
were used to discuss the 
information support needed to 
carry out the activities. 
The current support provided 
was compared to that which was 
needed to undertake activities.  
Gap and opportunities were 
identified and used as the basis 
for a re-formulated information 
strategy. 
Public policy 
development in 
the Netherlands 
(Hickling, 1990) 
SCA The development of a Liquid 
Petroleum Gas policy in the 
Netherlands relating to the 
landing, storage, transportation 
and shipment of the gas.  The 
issues related to LPG were in the 
public conscience due to a recent 
(1978) accident involving LPG 
where a substantial number of 
Focus is on managing and 
reducing three types of 
uncertainty (environment, 
related fields, values). 
Approaches were used to reduce 
uncertainty about the 
environment (such as risk 
analysis).  For uncertainties 
identified late in the process or 
Options were identified and 
compared against multiple 
criteria including how they 
addressed key areas of 
uncertainty identified.   The 
resulting output was a 
commitment package which 
identified decisions to be made 
immediately (actions & further 
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casualties had occurred. which were not amenable to 
reduction, assumptions were 
made. For example how demand 
for LPG in the Netherlands would 
grow. 
explorations) and those which 
could be deferred. 
Participant 
involvement in 
planning for the 
Danish Forest & 
Nature Agency 
Hjortso (2004) 
SODA – preliminary 
stages 
The case sought to improve public 
participation (as represented by 
members of stakeholder groups via 
the user council) in a strategic 
forest management planning 
process. 
Not reported in the case. The early stages of the SODA 
methodology were followed 
(Individual cognitive maps 
produced from interviews which 
were then verified and used to 
produce an analysis of key 
issues). The resulting output was 
an idea and debate catalogue. 
Focus was on problem 
structuring and participant 
involvement rather than decision 
making. 
Community 
planning for rural 
education in South 
Africa 
Phahlamohlaka & 
Friend (2004) 
SCA & NGT (nominal 
group technique). 
An exploration of strategic issues 
and a need to move towards an 
agreement on a package of actions 
that could be fed into the Trust’s 
planning process. 
The case notes that some 
uncertainty areas were listed but 
does not give details. 
A deviation from the planned 
approach (identifying a set of 
options for comparison and 
choice).  The deviation suggested 
the options could all be pursued 
in parallel, rather than some 
being delayed or not chosen; the 
participants accepted this 
suggestion. 
Evaluating the 
operational 
function of a UK 
based 
intermediate care 
system (health & 
social care system 
SSM & DES (discrete 
event simulation) 
Evaluating a new system which 
was not well understood by those 
charged with its implementation. 
‘What-if’ scenarios were used in 
the first phase of DES modelling 
to explore what the future might 
hold for the existing IC services. 
SSM techniques were used to 
help structure the situation; 
CATWOE analysis and activity 
modelling were used to identify 
which primary tasks of the IC 
function should be in place in an 
ideal world, which in turn helped 
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for older people) 
Kotiadis & Mingers 
(2006) 
to structure the evaluation 
issues.   
 
Two DES models were built, one 
of existing IC services used to 
assess resources, and one of the 
patient referral decision making 
process with a desire to improve 
on the current ad-hoc decision 
process 
Modernising the 
UK’s personal tax 
system Brown et al 
(2006) 
SSM + Data mining A study of the scope for 
modernising the operation of the 
UK’s personal tax system.  The 
study undertook to consult 
relevant stakeholders. 
 
Not reported in the case. Data mining was used to 
establish profiles of customer 
groups.  SSM was used, in 
conjunction with the results of 
the data mining to learn about 
the current tax system and to 
take account of stakeholder 
views in generating ideas for 
change in the redesign of the 
system. 
Information 
systems strategy 
development at 
Sainsbury’s, 
Ormerod (1995) 
Bespoke 
methodology 
drawing on elements 
of SCA, SODA, SSM, 
SWOT & other 
tools/methodologies. 
The Corporate Systems Strategy 
Project was designed to build on 
previous successes with the 
company’s information systems 
strategy.  The project team 
consisted of senior managers from 
the main line departments led by 
the Data Processing department.  
The author of the paper was a 
consultant for PA at the time of 
the work and was brought in to 
facilitate the work. 
 
Not reported in the case. A bespoke methodology was 
designed drawing on a number of 
other tools and methodologies: 
 
Phase 1 – Business imperatives – 
understand the company & its 
environment – tools used: SODA 
(cognitive maps from individual 
interviews, merged into a single 
map); SCA (shaping mode); 
strategy & management tools (eg 
SWOT, Porter’s five forces, de 
Bono’s 6 thinking hats). 
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The team were required to 
“…understand the current business 
processes, evaluate the future 
scope of technology and then to 
identify user needs and 
opportunities that would increase 
profitability, service and 
competitive advantage and would 
reduce cost.” (p 280) 
 
The consultant (author) proposed 
an approach “…to work closely 
with Sainsbury’s in a learning 
process, involving a new 
generation of managers, fostering 
creativity and mind broadening, 
producing an IT strategy that fits 
Sainsbury’s, based on a shared 
understanding to generate 
commitment at Board level." 
(p281) 
 
Phase 2 – Future systems – more 
detailed analysis of business 
areas selected in phase 1, in 
order to identify candidate 
systems for investment.  The 
complete SSM methodology was 
used to support this phase. 
 
Phase 3 – Evaluation – the 
comparing and choosing modes 
of SCA were used.  In addition, a 
quantitative evaluation was 
undertaken, using ideas from 
VSM. 
 
Phase 4 – Strategy – the 
prioritised portfolio of candidate 
systems developed in stage 2 
were considered.  No particular 
methods were used to support 
this phase – issues were debated 
and written up by the project 
team. 
Scottish Natural 
Heritage, Eden & 
Ackerman (2002) 
Journey Making 
including stakeholder 
analysis and scenario 
development 
The client (CEO) wanted to surface 
the strategic issues facing the 
management team, considering a 
wide range of external factors, 
some of which they might want to 
manipulate.  This work would 
contribute to the organisation’s 
strategy development.  He also 
wanted to consider the reaction of 
Experts were used to support 
scenario development.  Scenarios 
were used to test the strategic 
options being considered. 
Multiple facilitated workshops 
were used over a period of time, 
some involving stakeholders. 
Collective ownership of the 
strategy was a key goal of the 
process.   A variety of approaches 
were used in interviews and 
participative workshops including 
oval and cognitive mapping to 
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stakeholders (internal and 
external).  . 
surface issues and emergent 
goals, stakeholder analysis and 
management, and scenario 
development.  Some of the 
workshops were computer-
assisted.  The collection of 
analyses were used in a final 
participative workshop, involving 
some 50 senior managers, to 
develop a strategic action 
programme for each of 8 
prioritised strategies.   
Community 
involvement in 
water 
conservation, 
Foote et al (2007) 
Scenario building 
and rich pictures 
(SSM) 
Theory of boundary critique was 
used to design a problem 
structuring workshop to help 
reframe people’s understanding of 
a 30 year conflict between the 
District Council and local 
community around issues of water 
scarcity and conservation. 
Participants worked in one of six 
groups who were tasked with 
developing a best or worst case 
scenario associated with the 
water conservation campaign, 
universal water metering and 
planned infrastructure upgrade 
projects.  Each scenario was 
presented visually as a rich 
picture.  
Scenario building used to capture 
scenarios related to the Council’s 
predefined technological 
proposals.  Rich pictures to 
encourage participants to co-
create a visual presentation of 
issues captured in each scenario.  
Suggested performance measure 
and possible implementation 
barriers were also identified. 
 
Table 1: Illustrating applications of Soft OR approaches 
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 We do not have space here to provide a full account of the basic IL method in practice, but such 
accounts can be found in the literature (Goodwin & Wright, 2014; van der Heijden et al., 2002; Cairns 
and Wright, 2018).  Since the origins and much of the early literature on the IL approach lie in the 
practice domain and lack critical discussion of issues of methodological and conceptual rigour, 
scenario planning has been subject to academic critique, as discussed in the next section. 
5.2 Critique of scenario planning as a practitioner ‘art’ 
 The lack of a theoretical underpinning has meant that the basic IL approach to scenario planning 
has been subject to critique over the years, with various writers describing it as a ‘practitioner tool’ 
(Hodgkinson, 2001; Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002), and as an ‘imperfect tool’ (e.g. Hamel 2000; 
Hyde 1999; Mintzberg et al. 1998; Porter 1985). Scenario narratives have been considered as mere 
speculations, dealing with matters of opinion rather than of fact. Mintzberg (1994. p. 248) postulated 
that scenario analysis offered a scattergun approach to exploring potential futures where, “by 
speculating upon a variety (of futures), you might just hit upon the right one”.  
In their review of extant literature on the IL approach, Wright, Bradfield and Cairns (2013) 
questioned the degree to which the standard method challenged conventional thinking, reframed 
perceptions, and promoted change in the mindsets of managers within organisations. They argued that 
the process of envisioning a sequence of possible events within a scenario narrative will likely prompt 
participants to attach greater probability to their likely occurrence than would be implied by the 
normative probability computed for the intersection of these individually-evaluated events. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1983) identified this bias, caused by the mental operation of the ‘simulation 
heuristic’. As a result, the act of constructing scenarios may, in itself produce increased, but 
inappropriate, confidence in the likelihood of any single scenario unfolding as reality. However, it 
must be noted that the use of multiple scenarios provides plausible, but different, chains of causality.   
In addition, the basic IL method leaves several key aspects of strategic decision making to 
informal or holistic consideration - usually options are evaluated against the constructed set of 
scenarios in a simple Way, such as judgmentally allocating a number of “ticks” or “crosses” as a 
option/scenario performance measure. Notably, trade-offs between multiple objectives are not 
addressed and the relative power and potential future behaviour of stakeholders as they experience the 
unfolding of events within a particular scenario are not considered. Additionally, in the basic Il 
scenario development process, itself, there is no design element to mitigate the possible effects of 
status and power differences between participants. For example, relatively junior participants may be 
reluctant to advance opinions that are likely to be unpopular with senior managers. Also, importantly, 
the basic IL method does not address issues to do with the receptiveness of the organization or 
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workshop participants to the intervention. Further, as a time-consuming process, it does not address 
possible time constraints of workshop participants. 
Thus in returning to the six attributes of methods for dealing with wicked problems identified 
earlier, we note that the basic IL approach exhibits – but, arguably, does not fully satisfy - the the six 
ideal attributes of a method designed to tackle wicked problems. In particular it is deficient in 
achieving  attribute one (sound theoretical underpinning) and six (articulated action, responsibility, 
implications and impact).  The following section explores recent augmentations to the basic IL 
approach and considers the extent to which they address these two major gaps and further satisfy the 
attainment of attributes two, three, four and five. 
 
 
6.0 Augmentations of the IL scenario process: contributions to wicked problem resolution – 
theory and practice 
 
6.1 Development of theoretical underpinnings 
Researchers studying the  IL scenario process have  shown that it can be underpinned  by  theories 
both of how individuals confront uncertainty and how group processes integrate and mould individual 
perceptions.  At the individual level Simon  (e.g ., see Prietula and Simon, 1989)  has discussed how 
experts are able to recognise familiar  elements in  new  situations but Kahneman,  (2011)  has also 
shown that, when an expert’s experience is not relevant  in a particular situation, they may make 
erroneous judgments without being aware of  this. In particular, they may resort to simplified mental 
strategies, or heuristics. These heuristics are likely to lead to biases when judgments about 
probabilities are required. Other researchers (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1994)  have argued that the use of 
probabilities is inappropriate where unique non-repeated events are concerned.   In particular, Shackle 
(1949) argued   that  individual decision makers cannot have access to exhaustive list of possible 
future states of the world  or the knowledge to attach probabilities to these states (see also: Basili, and 
Zappia, 2009).  
 As an alternative, Shackle developed his Potential Surprise Theory (PST) .  Derbyshire (2017) 
has recently demonstrated that PST contains an axiom base that can be used to underpin normative 
applications of the IL scenario development method. A key foundation is that PST is based on the 
plausibility of future events rather than probability. A second foundation of PST is that the future is 
seen as to-be-imagined and is thus judgmentally-based. In PST, the decision maker chooses between 
strategies in terms of; (i) expected potential gains and losses, and (ii) the decision maker’s degree of 
disbelief (i.e., the implausibility) of a particular outcome. Crucially, unlike belief in a particular 
outcome, one's disbelief in several currently-considered future outcomes is not necessarily affected in 
any way by consideration of, and disbelief in, a newly-considered future outcome.  Moreover, the IL 
approach to scenario analysis and PST focus on plausible extreme outcomes. Derbyshire demonstrates 
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that the reasoning between Shackle’s rejection of probability provides strong theoretical support for 
IL-based scenario analysis as a normative decision-aiding – given that each of the axioms of PST are 
accepted as reasonable by the decision maker.  
 Shackle’s reference to imagined futures raises the question of  how people view such prospective 
worlds. In PST a scenario is an overall outcome rather than a developing sequence of events as in Il 
scenario planning. However, narrative theory proposes that  narrative is a fundamental human strategy 
for making sense of the elements of our experience such as changes and time (Herman et al. 2010). 
Narratives make issues concrete allowing decision makers to visualize them and their potential 
implications. According to Gabriel (2000), rather than merely recounting events, they can enhance 
and enrich them, endowing them with meaning. The generation of multiple scenarios in scenario 
planning relates to Boje's 'antenarrative' theory (Boje, 2001). Here an antenarrative is defined as “a 
fragmented, non-linear, incoherent, collective, unplotted, and pre-narrative speculation”. From this 
fragmentation  and ambiguity multiple narratives, and hence multiple,  scenarios can emerge (Cairns 
et al., 2017). 
 Theories such as PST relate to individual decision making but scenario planning is usually 
applied in a social context. Social constructionism posits that  people develop  shared assumptions of 
reality through social processes that  involve jointly constructed understandings  of the world. In this 
process, individuals create mental models to make sense of  their experiences of the world and use 
language to share these models and  to turns them into concrete perceptions of reality  (Leeds-
Hurwitz, 2009). Kolb (1983)  has applied his theory of  individual learning to these social processes 
postulating that  learning will be enhanced  when diverse decision making  groups involve individuals 
possessing the skills in his ‘learning loop’:  the ability to form theories,  the ability to assess the 
implications of theories in new situations, and the ability to recall concrete experiences and  reflect on 
them so that discrepancies between out mental models and  reality are revealed (van der Heijden, 
1996). 
 Cairns et al. (2010) have  used the term ‘Critical Scenario Method’ to refer to an approach 
which interrogates scenarios from the standpoints of different stakeholders (see section 6.3.2). This is 
underpinned  by Flyvberg’s modern version of Aristostle’s concept of phronēsis, referred to earlier. 
According to Flybberg, (Flyvberg, 2003) the principal task for phronetic research is to clarify values, 
interests, and power relations as a basis for practical action. Questions addressed in this process 
include: (1) who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power  and (2) what, if anything, 
should we (including all stakeholders where possible) do about it? This is achieved by developing in-
depth narratives of how power works and with what consequences, and to suggest how power might 
be changed and work with other consequences.  
In summary,   PST now provides a theoretical axiom base for IL scenario planning and so 
promotes IL to be a competitor to decision analysis, whilst the other theoretical underpinnings that 
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have been outlined, such as narrative thinking, learning from experience, and phronetic research, 
provide more general support to underpin components of the IL approach in practice.Other theoretical 
foundations for scenario planning can be found in the work of  Chermack  (2004) and in systems 
theory.  
 
6.2 Making sense of complexity: structured decomposition of causality 
A cornerstone of rigorous scenario analysis is an acceptance of ‘causal pluralism’ (cf. Goodier et al., 
2010), the origins of which can be traced back to Aristotle (cf. Derbyshire and Wright, 2017) through 
the lineage of Nietzsche (1885/1968) and his rejection of any single ‘logic’ of causality. For 
Nietzsche, causal linkages are matters of explanatory convenience for the purposes of intelligibility. 
As such, in exploring causal linkages in scenario analysis different understandings of causality that 
exist, say, between an accountant and an engineer must be made overt and addressed. Derbyshire and 
Wright (2017) have argued that the causality analysis at the heart of the IL method can be enhanced 
by applying the structured decomposition of cause that is the essence of Aristotle’s very early 
distinctions between different types of cause. He differentiated material cause, formal cause and final 
cause from efficient cause and we explain these nuances next.  
Efficient Cause is the type of causation in which some earlier event precipitates and brings about 
another event occurring later in time, in a chronological sequence of cause-and-effect.  Identification 
of this type of ‘general’ cause is the focus of the basic IL scenario development method, above. 
Material Cause focusses on the ‘material’ from which any object is made. Water is normally seen as a 
liquid, but at lower temperature it becomes ice – illustrating a material step-change. The search for 
material cause involves seeking out the causes of a step-change transformation. Such step-changes 
are, of course, important considerations for the logic of scenario generation. 
Formal Cause directs focus to the formal structures that facilitate or impede action. For example, 
strategic plans can be viewed as the formal cause of an organization’s activities. Laws and regulations 
can be seen as impeding or facilitating different types of organizational action. MacKay and Tambeau 
(2013) focused their conceptual analysis on the underlying basis of scenario construction and identify 
enduring social structures – including cultural and economic systems that are governed by rules and 
resources – as the major determinants of human actions. In so doing, they integrated ‘structuration 
theory’ with scenario method. Human actions are seen here as both constrained and facilitated by 
existing social and economic structures, and so they posit that interactions between human actions and 
such structures are pivotal in understanding the way in which the future might unfold. 
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Final Cause focusses on the motivations of self-interested individuals, groups and organizations who 
have power to take action within an unfolding future. As we have seen, consideration of power and 
the powerful is not part of the basic IL scenario development methodology. 
Derbyshire and Wright (2017) show that interaction of the different types of cause can 
prevent particular causes from having an intended effect, and that a detailed decomposition and 
analysis of the interplay between the forces of efficient cause, material cause, formal cause, and final 
cause is necessary to provide a comprehensive understanding of the plausible unfolding of future 
states of the world. By making explicit the four different types of causes, and adapting the IL process 
specifically to uncover them, there is a greater likelihood of the full range of important causes being 
uncovered (Derbyshire and Wright, 2017). 
 
6.3 Enhancing participative inquiry: addressing the scenario team participants’ cognitive styles and 
modelling the full stakeholder constituency 
 
6.3.1 Addressing individual participants’ cognitive styles 
The popular literature on the use of scenario technique mostly reports only on success stories of 
successful interventions. The practitioner writers are, understandably, less likely to report failure. As 
such, the extant literature has been less than helpful in generating evidence for guidelines on best 
practice in facilitating group-based involvement in strategic thinking. Recently, however, Franco et al. 
(2013) focused on the individuals who are the participants in scenario workshops. Using knowledge 
of the psychology of individual difference, they conceptualised and analysed workshop activity that is 
linked to individuals' modes of information gathering and evaluation. These authors contend that the 
mix of such ‘cognitive styles’ within the participants at a particular scenario workshop will determine 
the efficiency of the overall team in engaging with particular components of a scenario development 
process – such as reducing and selecting the key uncertainty factors  and fleshing-out the detail of the 
scenario storylines. If the cognitive styles of workshop participants cannot be pre-selected, these 
authors provide guidelines for the successful facilitation of varied group memberships. Hodgkinson 
and Healy (2008) provided guidelines based on a different conceptualisation of pertinent individual 
differences. Neither conceptualisation has been evaluated empirically, to date. 
 
6.3.2 Modelling Stakeholder behaviour  
In critical scenario method (CSM) (Cairns et al., 2010) there is specific consideration of the impacts 
of the different scenario storylines on the full range of stakeholders, including those that are remote, 
often excluded and future generations. Initial consideration of the full range of stakeholders involves 
eliciting a list of all those individuals and organizations who might either affect or be affected by the 
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unfolding of the focal issue of the scenario project. It is important to surface as many separate 
stakeholders as possible, not just broad categories. For example, initial stakeholder identification by 
participants will normally include ‘media’, ‘politicians’, and the like. However, discussion with them 
will clarify that the group ‘media’ has many constituents, from national television to local newspapers 
and, in this age, social media platforms. Each has its own degree of interest in the issue to hand and its 
level of power to impact the unfolding of its future.  
Identifying the stakeholders leads into consideration of how they will individually affect or be 
affected by a particular, unfolding scenario. Factors of ‘interest’ and ‘power’ underpin stakeholder 
analysis and form the axes for the resultant matrix (see Wright and Cairns, 2011, pp. 92-93 for the 
format and dynamics of stakeholder mapping). Cairns , Goodwin and Wright (2016) have extended 
these ideas and proposed a formal method, based on multiattribute decision analysis, to gain insights 
into the likely future actions of stakeholders under different scenarios as they seek to achieve multiple 
objectives. 
From experience, we have found that participants will often equate power with interest – for 
example, assuming that the Prime Minister will have an immediate interest in some regional matter, 
rather than being fully focused on the bigger issue of the day, such as economic turmoil at a global 
level. Research into the effectiveness of how people engage with understanding others has highlighted 
that the adoption of ‘role-playing’ will result in consistently better decisions than will mere ‘role-
thinking’ (Green and Armstrong, 2011). This has been found to be the case even where the decision 
makers have no direct experience of interaction with and little knowledge of the life-world of those 
that they are playing. Cairns and Wright (2018) detail how role-playing can be incorporated into the 
basic IL scenario development method. 
 
6.4 Presenting challenge to current mindsets 
 
6.4.1 Augmenting group process 
Rather than having team members working cohesively on the scenario process, there are two methods 
that introduce explicit challenge to the in-development scenario storylines by participants. Schweiger, 
Sandberg, & Ragan (1986) discuss these approaches for introducing conflict and debate through role-
play and splitting the main group into two or more sub-groups. The adoption of a ‘devil’s advocacy’ 
approach involves one sub-group at a time putting forward a proposed decision or a strategy option. 
Another sub-group plays the role of devil’s advocate, critically challenging and probing the first sub-
group’s proposal. In ‘dialectical inquiry’, each sub-group develops its own decision or strategy 
options, and all participants then come together to debate the range of assumptions and 
recommendations that relate to a particular issue. Both methods encourage the full group to; (i) 
generate alternative options for decisions and strategies, and (ii) minimise any tendency to 
‘groupthink’ and an early agreement on one option, without consideration of others. Formalising these 
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approaches can overcome tendencies for individuals to be reticent about voicing criticism to preserve 
the harmony of the group. Research has shown that both methods will lead to development of a high-
level of understanding of the reasoning underpinning the final group decision amongst group 
members. 
 Schweiger, Sandberg, & Rechner (1989) tested the use of both approaches to inducing 
conflict, comparing them to a non-adversarial approach to decision making, in which group discussion 
was used, with the aim of achieving consensus among members. Using a questionnaire to gather 
ratings from group participants, they found that both conflict-based approaches were rated higher, 
both in terms of producing better outcomes and in prompting more effective questioning of 
assumptions.  While it is thereby shown that formalizing and legitimizing conflict generates higher-
ranked perceptions of the quality of the final outcome of group decision making, it must be considered 
that – if such conflict and role-play is not sensitively managed – the impact might be to negatively 
affect the group’s ability to work together harmoniously in future.   
In practice, scenario development sometimes involves a scenario team composed of 
representatives from multiple agencies – i.e., the scenario team is initially formed from a 
heterogeneous constituency. In the more usual scenario development activity, conducted within a 
single organization, the basic IL process results in the initial development of four skeleton scenarios 
that are then each fleshed-out by one of four sub-groups. However, since differences in world-views 
between these sub-groups are likely to be small, we recommend that once a particular scenario is fully 
developed it should then be given an adversarial critique by one or more of the other subgroups. In 
this way, also, the systematic introduction of conflict and challenge is likely to enhance the quality of 
the finally-developed scenarios. Cairns and Wright (2018) detail how group-based challenge can be 
incorporated into the basic IL scenario development process. Also, in supporting strategy 
development, one approach that has adopted a dialectical stance is SAST - Strategic Assumptions 
Surfacing and Testing (Mason & Mitroff, 1979) a method for surfacing and challenging assumptions 
made by decision makers.  
 
6.4.2 Improving weak signal and blind spot detection 
Horizon scanning, as an organizational activity, attempts to identify and focus on ‘early warning 
signals’ of important change in the business environment – the identification of ‘flags’ or important 
signals amongst noise.  Ramirez et al. (2013) used case examples from the companies Nokia and 
Statoil to document the relationship between scenario development and the monitoring of early 
warning signals in the business environment. In their case analysis, these authors explored the degree 
of synergy between these two activities and argued that the combination of activities can create 
potential competitive advantage by providing a continuous strategic service to top management, in 
contrast to the discontinuity often inherent in a sequence of scenario exercises. 
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 In another study, Schoemaker et al. (2013) also considered the issue of how scenario 
development can be used as a basis for recognising and responding to ‘weak signals’ in the external 
environment. These authors argued that the contemporary, highly networked, organization has 
extensive points of contact with the external world and how, while expanding the opportunities for 
recognition of emergent opportunities and threats, this also presents the threat itself of leaving the 
organization unable to spot useful signals amongst the ‘avalanche of data’. They outlined an approach 
to seeking such useful signals amongst background noise based upon the adoption of a ‘strategic radar 
system’ and they illustrated the approach with a brief case study of a large government agency. 
 It is important to note that each developed scenario represents a single set of antecedent 
(driving) forces, each leading to a distinct, scenario end-state outcome via sequences of cause-and-
effect relationships. Recall that each ‘resolved’ cause (i.e., each driving force –whether a pre-
determined element or an uncertainty resolved as a particular outcome) precipitates another outcome 
in the causal chain until the sequenced outcome of the chain is realised. In this ‘efficient cause’ 
perspective on causality, knowledge of the chain events’ initial causes implies knowledge of the 
chain’s ultimate outcome and so, logically, identification of an ‘early warning’ or ‘weak signal’ is 
possible (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014; Ramirez et al., 2013; Schoemaker et al., 2013).  
 Here, an ‘early warning’ would be the occurrence of a particular outcome at an early point in 
the pre-identified, sequenced chain of driving force. As a result, application of the basic IL scenario 
development methodology gives the misimpression that all that is necessary to avoid an undesirable 
future is to be alert to the start of an occurrence of a particular sequence of events and, upon noticing 
such an unfolding, to take action to avoid the undesirable outcome described by the scenario. 
However, in Derbyshire and Wright’s (2017) analysis, not only are there multiple possible futures, 
there are also multiple possible causal paths to each future. Each future end-state has multiple 
possible sets of antecedent causes. Importantly, this consideration, that there may be multiple possible 
paths to a single future, is unrecognised within the basic IL approach to scenario development – and 
has no emphasis in all the other approaches to scenario development (Bradfield et al., 2005).  
 Crucially, it follows that, since there are multiple possible paths to any particular future, 
activities designed to sensitise an organization to indications that a particular causal path of events 
beginning to occur – by so-called ‘horizon-scanning’ functional units – are misplaced. Uncertainty 
associated with the future is much more complex than implied by particular scenarios – or even a set 
of multiple scenarios. As such, extant methods for identifying weak signals will lead to either: (i) 
unfocussed, or (ii) focussed but naive assessment of possible important weak signals or flags – since 
their identification will either be happenstance or limited to those prompted by already-developed 
scenarios.  The most important scenarios for an organization are often the ones where an 
organization’s objectives are met in the extreme – either negatively or positively – and the basic IL 
method of scenario development may not produce such plausible but extreme scenarios. Also, any 
particular scenario that is developed may not sensitise a manager to the true sequence of causality that 
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unfolds. As such, the basic IL scenario development method is of weak utility to aid the prior 
identification of all important but ‘weak’ signals.  
 Fortunately, the ‘backwards logic method’ (BLM) for scenario development (Wright and 
Goodwin, 2009) provides an answer to this major issue (for more detail on the combination of the 
BLM with horizon scanning see Rowe et al., 2017). First, note that the initial causal elements of 
extreme scenarios are identified in the BLM development process and that these initial causal 
‘triggers’, now identified, can next be easily adopted as important, focal ‘weak signals’ that should be 
carefully monitored in a subsequent, on-going horizon scanning process.  
 An additional precautionary measure is to ensure that a full range of weak signals are being 
monitored in any organizationally-based horizon scanning activity. Meissner et al (2017) define a 
process for identifying blind spots and weak signals in an horizon scanning activity in their so-called 
‘3600 stakeholder feedback’ technique. Here, members of an organization and, importantly, opinion 
leaders who are also knowledgeable about the focal organization and its environment but are affiliated 
to external organizations (that are likely to have different perspectives) are recruited. They are then 
asked to identify and describe factors that may influence the future development of the focal 
organization – with reference to the PESTEL set of dimensions.  By their method, a ‘blind spot’ exists 
within the organization if the internal experts’ ratings of both the impact and uncertainty of a 
particular factor are significantly lower than those of the external experts. Also, by their method, a 
‘weak signal’ exists if a particular factor was mentioned by few people in a first round of evaluations 
but was then rated of high impact and high uncertainty in a second round of evaluations by most of 
the participants. 
 
6.5  Acknowledging uncertainty 
This attribute is, we contend, already well-addressed in the basic IL scenario development method, 
outlined earlier. Our discussions in Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 indicate how the recent augmentations to 
the basic method further satisfy achievement of this attribute. 
 
 6.6 Informing decision making and subsequent action 
 
  6.6.1 Formal analysis of multiple objectives  
A distinction needs to be made between papers in the literature which regard scenarios as options that 
need to be ranked in order of preference (e.g. Browne et al., 2010, Ribeiro et al. 2013)  and those that 
discuss the problem of identifying the ‘best’ strategy across a range of scenarios that may prevail. 
Only the latter case will be discussed here. The absence in scenario planning of formal methods to 
support strategic decisions involving multiple objectives was explored by Goodwin and Wright 
(2001). They suggested that multi-attribute decision analysis methods based on the simple multi-
attribute rating technique (SMART) could be combined with scenario methods to compare the 
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performance of alternative strategies across both the objectives and the scenarios. Approaches like 
SMART bring the benefits of decomposition to the process and also allow for the formal structuring 
of objectives hierarchies (Montibeller and Franco, 2011) and sensitivity analysis. Linares (2002) used 
a similar approach, but the strategies were evaluated using a combination of the Analytic Hierarchy 
process (AHP) and goal programming. Durbach and Stewart (2003) also demonstrate how goal 
programming can be used in combination with scenario planning.  
In practice, a balance needs to be struck between the advantages of relative simple methods, 
which are likely to be more palatable and transparent to decision makers, and the benefits of more 
complex methods that are both theoretically sound and provide a more accurate representation of the 
decision problem.  While the use of SMART in this context, as proposed by Goodwin and Wright, 
offers relative simplicity and transparency it assumed that the same weights could be attached to the 
objectives in all scenarios. This implies that the relative desirability of swings from the worst to the 
best performances on the different objectives is the same, regardless of the scenario. This proved to be 
problematical in applications of Goodwin and Wright’s method by Montibeller et al. (2006) and they 
suggested improvements which were subsequently used in three public sector applications (Ram and 
Montibeller, 2013). However, the number of judgments that need to be elicited from decision makers 
can be large, given the combinations of objectives, strategies and scenarios and attaching different 
weights can add considerably to this burden. Schroeder and Lambert (2011) suggest a method for 
obtaining scenario-specific weights that reduces the size of the elicitation task. This involves 
determining a set of weights for a ‘base scenario’ and then reweighting criteria for other scenarios 
based on whether they require a major or minor increase or decrease from those elicited for the base 
scenario. In an alternative attempt to reduce the demands placed on decision makers, Wright and 
Cairns (2011) suggested that the interval-scale ratings that are used in SMART to reflect the 
performance of each strategy on a given objective can be replaced by simple rankings.   
The methods based on SMART produce a table showing an aggregate score for each strategic 
option in each scenario. While decision makers are free to examine this table and choose options 
based, for example, on their attitude to risk there can be an absence of formal guidance, at this stage. 
The common suggestion is that the strategy that has the most robust performance across scenarios 
should be chosen, but as argued earlier, there are problems with the definition of robustness and 
questions about its desirability in some cases (Stewart et al., 2013). Ram and Montibeller (2013) 
displayed the regret associated with each option across the scenarios (i.e. the under-performance of an 
option in a given scenario relative to the best performing option in that scenario) to provide guidance 
to their decision makers on robustness in three case studies. Other authors imply that robustness is 
associated with a relative lack of variation of aggregate scores across scenarios, but Stewart et al. 
(2013) argue that this may obscure the benefits of strategic options where: ‘equity between criteria are 
dominant (e.g. where the criteria are linked to the interests of different stakeholders)’. Such conditions 
might apply where there is a danger that a chosen strategy will lead to the best outcome for one 
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stakeholder but the worst for another.  A strategy where both simultaneously obtain either their best or 
their worst outcomes might be preferable (we deal with the issue of taking into account the diverse 
interests of stakeholders later on). Stewart et al. propose that each scenario-criterion combination 
should be regarded as a metacriterion. Alternative strategies should be evaluated against these 
metacriteria in the same way that options are evaluated against ordinary criteria in conventional multi-
attribute decision analysis, albeit with some form of hierarchical elicitation to make the task tractable, 
when there are a large number of metacriteria. 
 
6.6.2 Use of scenario orientation 
There are a multitude of tasks and activities involved in a scenario planning process.  As a result, 
projects are often conducted across multiple workshops; some workshops run over consecutive days, 
but others are scheduled over a period of weeks or months with longer gaps in between.  Where a 
scenario project is conducted across a series of workshops, there may be a delay or gap between the 
development of the scenarios and their subsequent use to support strategy development.  Additionally, 
there is no guarantee of continuity of participation spanning the phases of scenario development and 
use.  In some settings, this may be unavoidable due to competing commitments; in others it may have 
been intentional, such as when the scenarios are intended for wider dissemination.  Where there is a 
time delay or changes in the personnel involved between scenario development and use, the detailed 
understanding of the scenarios and the motivation for their development may be missing, forgotten or 
not be equally understood by all participants. All this leads to a decrement in both decision making 
and subsequent action. 
Bowman (2016) argues that a key benefit of scenario planning ‘mindset change’ only comes 
from participation “...in the episodic and continuous flow of sensemaking and storytelling.” (p 91); 
i.e. from engagement within and across workshops.  Where this is not practically possible, or where 
there is a break in the flow of workshops, a process of scenario orientation (O’Brien and Meadows, 
2013) can be a crucial phase in bringing newcomers on board, and ensuring that the group using the 
scenarios are familiar with them.  As the name suggests, orientation is a process of familiarisation that 
involves understanding the nature of the scenarios in some detail; such a process not only focuses on 
the product, the scenario stories, but also entails reviewing relevant aspects of the process through 
which they were generated.  Well-written and presented scenario narratives act as sense-giving 
artefacts (Bowman, 2016) which can facilitate participant engagement and buy-in during an 
orientation phase;  where scenarios are used within a public setting, they may serve to facilitate 
interaction and engagement of relevant stakeholder groups (Bowman et al, 2013). 
Where bringing together all participants in a face to face workshop is not practical or 
possible, the use of online platforms may offer an alternative setting; this forms an emerging area of 
research in the scenario literature.  Raford (2015) reflects on experiences from five case studies using 
different online platforms to support scenario planning exercises; he contrasts these experiences with 
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a face-to-face scenario exercise.  Four key findings are reported: online approaches offer the potential 
to increase the volume and diversity of participation; an increase in the amount and speed of data 
produced of volume produced; varied approaches were used to cluster and process factors; and 
improvements were observed in participant socialisation and interaction. 
 
6.6.3  Addressing senior decision makers’ time constraints 
A major problem that has been identified in scenario projects is the absence of senior decision and 
policy makers from the process (cf. Cairns et al., 2013), and how to engage with such ‘time poor’ 
individuals (Pincombe et al., 2013). One approach that has been proposed and discussed for engaging 
key stakeholders who are unable to commit to full engagement with a scenario development 
programme involves the use of Delphi inquiry (for explication of Delphi method, see Rowe and 
Wright, 2001). Delphi inquiry enables expert opinions regarding understandings of key uncertainties 
and their potential outturns to be sought in an asynchronous process, where individuals can choose 
when to participate subject to a common deadline. These opinions are shared anonymously amongst 
the  panel members, with both quantitative rankings and explanatory justifications and, on the basis of 
this sharing, these are revised by individuals and further shared anonymously over two or more 
rounds. Anonymity has the advantage that participants will not feel constrained in expressing their 
honest views because of the presence of more senior managers in the process. Collated data will show 
degrees of convergence or divergence in the individual views, change over the rounds, and will 
summarise the means and ranges for each factor, along with the explanatory narratives. Delphi 
method enables time-poor individuals to collaborate but without having to do so in real time. 
Delphi inquiry has been used to provide early input to the determination of the driving forces 
that will shape scenarios (Pincombe et al., 2013). Cairns et al. (2016) discuss a case of ‘limited 
success’ in a project that addresses the complex and ambiguous issue of ‘regional regeneration’, with 
multiple organizational stakeholders, having diverse priorities and cultures, and fragmented both in 
terms of time and of geography. Having employed Delphi inquiry at the end of the project to gain 
responses to issues highlighted in all-encompassing regional scenario outlines developed by an 
academic research team, they posit that the approach might more effectively be used to enable sub-
sets of the full project team with similar disciplinary interests and specific project priorities to engage 
at the outset. Here, decision makers might share ideas and perceptions and set a common foundation 
for development of more focused scenarios around their field of common interest. These scenarios 
might still be written by others, where time is a rare commodity, or they may prove more attractive for 
participation in the development process due to their immediate relevance to the individuals involved. 
For example, in relation to regional regeneration, local industry executives, public sector agency 
directors or educational leaders might focus on the potential contribution of their sector, and the 
opportunities and obstacles presented by external driving forces. They could then take their sector-
specific analyses and focussed scenarios back into the full forum of regional regeneration debate. This 
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approach might overcome what was seen to be a lack of commitment and focus by a divergent body 
of stakeholders. 
 
6.6.4 Facilitating translation into action and impact 
To move beyond scenario storyline development, and to give meaning to the ubiquitous – but 
frequently misrepresentational term – ‘scenario planning’, there is clearly a need for demonstrable 
actions designed to respond to each scenario narrative. Planning must be undertaken to eliminate, 
minimise or build resilience in the face of worst-case futures, and to take advantage of best-case 
circumstances. If planning is to be shown to be a direct consequence of scenario analysis, the final 
stages of any project should illustrate a list of clearly articulated actions that are directly informed by 
the scenario narratives. If the scenario project has engaged appropriate senior decision makers, this 
list of actions should include allocation of responsibility for ownership and implementation by 
individual participants. However, Rickards et al., (2014) have highlighted the lack of linkage between 
scenario outcomes and decision making as the key factor in challenging the effectiveness of scenario 
programmes. Cairns et al. (2013) provide a case study of a project in which senior members of various 
organizations committed to a shared list of actions, and accepted individual responsibility to follow 
up. However, the study outlines how, months after the scenario workshop, there was little or no 
evidence of follow-up. The authors discuss how this lack of action could not be simply attributed to 
other pressures ‘back at the office’. Rather, they point out that senior decision makers at the level of 
the project may not be the key policy makers at the highest level of decision making. As Bowman et 
al. (2013) point out, policy and strategy making are political (with a small ‘p’) processes and, as such, 
are subject to issues of trust, manoeuvring and the contradictions of short- and long-term goals. 
 The problem of determining and allocating responsibility for clearly articulated action is one 
of great complexity, particularly in multi-organizational projects. Cairns et al. (2017)  posit that large 
and complex projects might usefully be broken down into sub-programmes, each involving 
participants with shared interests and values, exploring the range of their perceptions and 
interpretations initially through Delphi inquiry, before engaging them in a clearly focused 
‘exploratory’ scenario exercise that is a discrete sub-set of the main project, and that can later inform 
an integrative ‘challenge’ scenario exercise by the most senior – and likely time-poor – policy makers. 
In this way, identification of actions and responsibility is distributed to those most appropriate at each 
stage, with a ‘cascading up’ of scenario analyses, outcomes and responses to these key individuals in 
a structured way. 
 
 
7.0 Comparison of both basic and augmented IL scenario method with soft OR methods when 
addressing wicked problems 
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Table 2 compares the basic IL method and its augmentations with the soft OR methods 
against each of the six desirable attributes that were discussed earlier. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
While scenario planning has emerged from practice, theoretical underpinnings for the method 
have been identified subsequently, as explained in section 6.1 . Of the soft OR methods, only 
SODA/Journey making has a clear foundation in theory. The origins of SCA have been described as 
“more empirical than theoretical… [reflecting]  not so much idealized principles of decision making 
as an explicit recognition of some of the ways in which people who face complex decision problems 
in practice learn to cope with the dilemmas of their work, even if only at an intuitive  level” (Friend, 
2001, p116). The social reality implied by the social theory that underpins SSM is unclear and 
Houghton and Ledington (2002) have described the literature as being highly confused about this 
matter. As argued earlier, the absence of clear theoretical underpinnings may limit the extent to which 
a method will be accepted as soundly-based for application in practical contexts. 
All of the methods involve structured iterative approaches and allow softer aspects of 
problems to be addressed. However the basic IL method is restrictive in that it neglects the decision 
making aspects of problems and the role of stakeholders – both in the formation of scenario teams 
and, more broadly,  in their reactions to (and plight within) unfolding scenario storylines . Recent 
augmentations of the method have begun to address the decision making aspects of scenario thinking 
(see Section 6.6)  but more research and practical method development  is required so that decision 
makers are not overloaded with elicitation tasks (Montibeller et al., 2006) and the robustness of 
decision options across scenarios can be further clarified (Stewart et al., 2013). 
With regards to stakeholders, a distinction needs to be made between modelling their 
behaviour and interests and directly involving them in the decision making process. All of the 
methods have the capacity to allow multiple stakeholders to participate in the process and for their 
different perspectives to be modelled, but only the IL method when combined with the Delphi method 
ensures that power and status differences are not influential in the process. 
Both SSM and SODA/Journey making emphasise learning and have mechanisms that have 
the potential to challenge existing mind sets. The SCA, like hard decision analysis, has no explicit 
element that is designed to provide such challenges and the basic IL method may actually reinforce 
current views. However, the IL method may benefit from the challenges generated through dialectical 
enquiry and the involvement of remarkable people. There seems to be no reason, in principle, why 
such augmentations could not also be applied to the SCA. While  the basic IL method can be 
associated with blind spots about potential changes in the environment and fails to recognise the 
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possibility of multiple paths leading to single future outcomes, recent augmentations, such as horizon 
scanning coupled with the backward logics method, should help to address these deficiencies. 
SSM and SODA/Journey Making do not explicitly address uncertainty, though the latter 
method has some limited provision for handling it within cognitive maps. In contrast, uncertainty is 
the central consideration in both the SCA and IL scenario planning, though  in SCA this may relate to 
current rather than future uncertainties.  SCA has formal mechanisms that encourage participants to 
broaden their perception of uncertainty and hence increases their awareness of the extent of the 
uncertainty they are facing.  
Finally, the methods vary in the extent to which they are likely to lead to the identification 
and implementation of specific strategies. SSM in its more recent form is primarily focussed on 
fostering learning and understanding rather than identifying and applying specific interventions 
(Houghton and Ledington, 2002).  Neither SODA/Journey Making nor the basic IL method provide 
formal support for comparing the merits and demerits of alternative strategies. Only the SCA and 
scenario planning augmented with multiattribute decision analysis provide this. In all cases 
participation is likely to encourage a joint commitment to action, but only SODA/Journey Making 
emphasises this aspect with its focus on negotiation and achieving consensus. Of course, 
implementation is more likely if participants are receptive to the application of a method. The SCA is 
designed to   achieve this receptiveness because it is intended to reflect the way that   people make 
decisions in practice.  The basic IL method has no formal element in its design that addresses the issue 
of receptiveness, though the narrative nature of its output is likely to accord with the way people 
naturally think about the world. However, breaking down the scenario planning exercise into sub 
programmes of people with shared interests and values allows actions and responsibilities to be 
distributed to those most appropriate, increasing the likelihood of implementation (see Section 6). 
It can be seen that in many respect the methods have complementary strengths and 
limitations. For example, SSM is designed to increase participants’ understand of wicked problems, 
but lacks formal consideration of uncertainty. The basic IL method emphasises future uncertainty but 
does not provide support for those who need to develop a strategy for dealing with it in complex 
problem situations.   Similarly, the causal structure of cognitive maps can be useful in identifying the 
interaction of factors that can lead to alternative scenarios (Goodier et al., 2010). Mingers (2001) and 
Ormerod (2001) discuss how to apply such multimethodologies in practice. 
 This paper set out to investigate the potential of IL scenario approaches for exploring wicked 
problems as defined within the OR field.  We identified six desirable attributes of methods designed 
to tackle wicked problems.  Our paper introduced the basic IL scenario method and described recent 
augmentations to it.  The basic and augmented IL scenario method were then compared against each 
of the six attributes, along with three of the classic soft OR approaches.   Our paper demonstrates that 
both the classic three soft OR approaches and the basic IL scenario method, when used on their own, 
fail to satisfy all six of the attributes relevant to wicked problem resolution.  It is through 
37 
 
augmentations and additions to the methodologies, within a multi-methodological framework, that the 
complete set of attributes can be satisfied. Importantly, in our analysis, only the augmented IL 
scenario method has an axiom-base to underpin its application in practice contexts. Further, the 
combination of IL with multi-attribute value analysis supplements and strengthens the axiom-based 
underpinning of the use of the IL scenario method as an aid to organisational decision making. 
Notably, of all the soft OR approaches that we have discussed, only the IL method deals explicitly 
with future uncertainty. In our view, the recently augmented IL scenario method now provides a well-
founded soft alternative to the hard decision analysis approach of making decisions in the face of 
uncertainty. For this reason, it should now be welcomed by soft OR practitioners as a well-designed, 
future-focussed tool that has a specific place - together with Soft Systems Methodology, the Strategic 
Choice Approach, and SODA/Journey Making – within the broad soft OR toolkit. In addition further   
research could usefully explore the  links between  the IL scenario method and soft OR  methods . For 
example,  SSM considers the development of one virtual world, while  within scenario planning, the 
concept of multiple alternative futures is important , suggesting that  this may be useful to an SSM 
intervention. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Desirable attribute 
 
SSM SCA 
SODA/ JOURNEY 
MAKING     INTUITIVE LOGICS SCENARIOS 
   
Basic method  Augmentations 
Sound theoretical foundation Developed from 
practice. 
Interpretive 
stance but 
relation to social 
theory is not 
clear. 
"Origins are 
empirical rather 
than intellectual" 
reflecting ways 
people handle 
complex decision 
problems. 
Theory is clearly 
articulated. 
Interpretive 
stance and draws 
on Kelly's theory 
of personal 
constructs. 
Practitioner 
driven -theory 
undeveloped 
Theoretical 
underpinnings 
subsequently 
developed. 
      
Involves structured decomposition to  minimise 
reduction and exclusion 
Structured 
iterative 
approach. 
Includes 
consideration of 
'softer' issues. 
Adopts systems 
approach to 
embrace 
complexity. 
Involves 
structured 
decomposition of 
uncertainty and 
choice process. 
Allows inclusion 
of 'softer' aspects. 
Cognitive maps or 
oval maps 
facilitate problem 
structuring. 
'Softer' aspects 
and stakeholder 
behaviour can be 
included. Merging 
individuals' maps 
broadens 
problem 
representation & 
may lead to 
expanded option 
set. 
Structured 
decomposition of 
different types of 
causality, but 
decision making 
aspects 
neglected. No 
formal analysis of 
stakeholder 
behaviour. 
Combination with 
multiattribute 
decision analysis 
allows formal 
comparison of 
strategic options. 
Stakeholder 
mapping allows 
behaviour of 
actors & power 
considerations to 
be incorporated. 
Decomposition of 
causality aids 
understanding of 
the unfolding of 
events. 
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Engages full stakeholder community Explicitly 
considers 
different 
perceptions of 
stakeholders 
using CATWOE 
tool and seeks to 
understand their 
world views. 
Power and status 
differences of 
participants not 
explicitly 
addressed. 
Ideally involves 
workshops of 6 to 
8 people.  Wider 
community can 
be consulted 
through 
workshop 
members' 
'constituencies'. 
Power and status 
differences of 
participants not 
explicitly 
addressed. 
Client is seen as 
small group: 3 to 
10 people. Use of 
oval mapping can 
increase no. of 
participants & 
reduce analysis 
time. Map 
merging and 
workshops allow 
participation of 
different 
stakeholders.  Key 
stakeholders 
identified though 
power -interest 
grids/star 
diagrams. 
Workshops allow 
participation by 
multiple 
stakeholders. 
Nothing in 
process to 
mitigate status & 
power differences 
between 
participants. 
Attention to 
individuals' 
cognitive styles 
may enhance 
efficiency of 
process. Delphi 
method allows 
participation of 
time constrained 
stakeholders and 
eliminates status 
differences. 
Online platforms 
and scenario 
orientation can 
widen 
participation. 
Critical Scenario 
method aids 
identification of 
all impacted 
stakeholders. 
      
Challenges mind-sets Emphasis on 
understanding & 
learning & 
interfacing of 
different world 
views may 
achieve this. 
May lead to 
shared learning 
amongst decision 
makers but like 
'hard' decision 
analysis, has no 
element explicitly 
designed to 
challenge mind 
sets. 
Emphasis on 
understanding & 
learning. 
Reflection on 
individual maps, 
negotiations & 
merging of 
individuals' maps 
may achieve this. 
No element 
explicitly 
designed to 
challenge mind 
sets. May even 
reinforce current 
mind sets. 
Possibility of 
multiple paths to 
single future 
'Remarkable 
people', devil's 
advocacy, & 
dialectical enquiry 
may challenge 
mind sets. 
Horizon scanning, 
blind spot 
detection & 
backward logics 
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outcomes 
unrecognised 
method may alert 
people to  
potential future 
changes.  
      
Acknowledges & responds to uncertainty Not explicitly 
addressed 
Addressing & 
responding to 
uncertainty is 
central to the 
approach, though 
emphasis may be 
on current rather 
than future 
uncertainties. 
Binary events 
represented by 
concepts on map 
with contrasting 
poles.  Maps may 
lead to 
identification of 
uncertainties. No 
formal method 
for addressing 
uncertainty. 
Acknowledges 
uncertainty but 
simulation 
heuristic may lead 
to its 
underestimation.  
The above 
augmentations  
should increase 
sensitivity to 
uncertainty. 
      
Lead to actions, responsibility, implications & 
impact 
Emphasis is on 
learning rather 
than intervention 
& problem 
solving. 
Designed to 
identify 
appropriate 
courses of action. 
Workshop 
participation 
encourages joint 
commitment. 
Designed to 
reflect way 
decisions are 
made in practice 
which may 
enhance 
participants' 
Emphasis is on 
negotiating 
consensus & 
hence 
commitment to 
action. No formal 
mechanism for 
identifying 
favoured options 
& facilitating 
implementation.  
Receptiveness to 
intervention by 
organization or 
participants not 
addressed. No 
formal 
mechanism for 
identifying 
favoured options 
& facilitating 
implementation.  
Break down of 
exercise into sub 
programmes of 
people with 
shared interests & 
values so that 
actions & 
responsibilities 
can be distributed 
to those most 
appropriate. 
Time-poor 
participants can 
be 
accommodated 
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acceptance of it. and the effects of 
a prolonged time-
duration of a 
particular 
scenario 
intervention can 
be attenuated. 
 
Table 2: Comparing approaches and how they address the six desirable attributes for dealing with wicked problems. 
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